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Abstract
Research has suggested that emotional states have critical effects on various cognitive
processes, which are important components of situation awareness (Endsley, 1995b).
Evidence from driving studies has also emphasized the importance of driver situation
awareness for performance and safety. However, to date, little research has investi-
gated the relationship between emotional effects and driver situation awareness. In
our experiment, 30 undergraduates drove in a simulator after induction of either anger
or neutral affect. Results showed that an induced angry state can degrade driver situa-
tion awareness as well as driving performance as compared to a neutral state. How-
ever, the angry state did not have an impact on participants’ subjective judgment or
perceived workload, which might imply that the effects of anger occurred below their
level of conscious awareness. One of the reasons participants showed a lack of com-
pensation for their deficits in performance might be that they were not aware of
severe impacts of emotional effects on driving performance.
1 Introduction
The evidence supporting subliminal or implicit perception comes from
various experimental sources. One of the salient examples is emotional effects.
For example, research has shown that subliminally flashed pictures displaying
emotionally positive or negative scenes impact the judgments of neutral pictures
of people (Murphy, Zajonc, & Monahan, 1995). These subliminally presented
emotional stimuli even activate cortical areas that mediate emotional experience
(Whalen et al., 1998). However, relatively little research has been conducted
regarding emotional effects on a dynamic situation such as driving or aviation.
Of the research on emotion within these dynamic situations, a focus has been
placed on the effects of emotions on performance outcomes, but not on possi-
ble underlying mechanisms. For example, research has shown that anger nega-
tively influences various driving performance and risky behaviors such as infrac-
tions, lane deviations, speed, and collisions (Deffenbacher, Deffenbacher,
Lynch, & Richards, 2003; Jeon, Yim, & Walker, 2011; Underwood, Chapman,
Wright, & Crundall, 1999). However, questions about the underlying mecha-
nisms of the effects still remain unanswered.
People are generally blind to their emotional feelings, even when they think
they are well aware of them (Picard, 2010). Even when individuals are aware of
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(or expect) their emotional state, it can still tremen-
dously influence people’s cognitive processes and behav-
iors if they are not aware of the potential effects of that
emotional state. The current paper attempts to identify
the underlying mechanism of these powerful emotional
effects, specifically anger, on driving performance in rela-
tion to situation awareness. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no research on the relationship between
emotional effects and situation awareness.
2 Emotional Effects on Cognition
Emotions have enormous effects on cognition,
ranging from selective influences on each stage of infor-
mation processing to overall influences on information
processing style, such as the relative weight given to top-
down and bottom-up processing (Lee, 2006). To illus-
trate, emotions influence the perception and organiza-
tion of memory (Bower, 1981); categorization and pref-
erence (Zajonc, 1984); goal generation, evaluation, and
decision-making (Damasio, 1994); strategic planning
(LeDoux, 1992); focus and attention (Derryberry &
Tucker, 1992); motivation and performance (Colquitt,
LePine, & Noe, 2000); intention (Frijda, 1986); com-
munication (Birdwhistle, 1970; Chovil, 1997; Ekman &
Friesen, 1975); and learning (Goleman, 1995). For a
recent review of influences of emotions on higher level
cognition such as interpretation, judgment, decision-
making, and reasoning, see Blanchette and Richards
(2010).
Traditionally, psychological sciences have suggested
various theories on the relationship among emotion,
physiological arousal, and cognition (e.g., the James–
Lange theory [James, 1884], the Cannon-Bard theory
[Cannon, 1927], and the Two-Factor theory [Schacter
& Singer, 1962]). One of the unresolved issues is
whether affective processes should be considered as a
part of the cognitive representational system or as an
entirely separate mental faculty (Fiedler, 1988; Hilgard,
1980; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Zajonc (1984) showed
that emotions can be aroused without the participation
of cognitive processes and thus, can function independ-
ently. Other theorists also underlined the possibility that
affect is external to, and may independently inform, cog-
nitive outcomes (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994;
Niedenthal, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1988; Strack,
Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Therefore, regardless of the
order between them, it is important to assume that
emotion and cognition are distinct (Forgas, 1995) and
emotional processes or effects are not necessarily
cognitively represented even though they influence
cognitive processes.
3 Situation Awareness and Driving
3.1 Cognitive Constructs and Situation
Awareness
Driving is a multitasking activity that requires a
driver to simultaneously manage various undertakings
including primary, secondary, and tertiary tasks (Geiser,
1985; Kern & Schmidt, 2009). One of the widely used
high-level cognitive models to explain such a dynamic
situation is the situation awareness (SA) model (Endsley,
1995a). Situation awareness is, in brief, an understand-
ing of the state of the environment including relevant
parameters of the system (Endsley, 1995b). According
to Endsley, decision-making and performance in com-
plex, dynamic environments are dependent on the
operator’s situational awareness.
Endsley’s (1995a) SA model illustrates three critical
states of SA formation: perception, comprehension, and
projection. Table 1 describes the relationship between
these three levels of the situation awareness model and
typical cognitive processes. Level 1 SA, perception, can
be described in relation to attention and perception in
traditional emotion research. Of course, attention may
influence all three levels of SA, but it can be accounted
for by similar mechanisms to perception and overall
processing style in emotion literature. Level 2 SA, com-
prehension, can be described in relation to interpretation
and judgment. Level 3 SA, projection, can also be
described by judgment and decision-making. Decision-
making is differentiated from the SA process in a narrow
sense in Endsley’s model. Based on this relationship, we
can postulate plausible emotional effects on overall oper-
ator situation awareness as well as specific levels of situa-
tion awareness.
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3.2 Situation Awareness and Driving
Given that poor SA is a greater cause of accidents
than improper speed or improper driving technique
(Gugerty, 2011), there have been attempts to try to con-
ceptualize driver SA and develop a driver situation
awareness model (e.g., Gugerty, 2011; Ma & Kaber,
2005; Matthews, Bryant, Webb, & Harbluk, 2001). To
illustrate, Matthews et al. have tried to propose a model
for driver situation awareness that can be used as a basis
for understanding the possible impact of the intelligent
transportation systems on driving performance.
From the driving perspective, SA includes spatial
awareness (i.e., an appreciation of the location of all rele-
vant features of the environment), identity awareness
(i.e., knowledge of salient items), temporal awareness
(i.e., knowledge of the changing spatial picture over
time), goal awareness (i.e., the highest goal may be the
navigation plan to the destination; at a lower level, the
maintenance of speed and direction to conform to the
navigation plan; and at a still lower level, the need to ma-
neuver and place the vehicle in an appropriate manner
within the surrounding traffic stream), and system
awareness (i.e., relevant information within the larger
driving environment as a system). These aspects of SA
have been integrated into a goal-oriented model of
driver behavior that encompasses strategic, tactical, and
operational goals of driving (Matthews et al., 2001;
Ward, 2000). For instance, operational driving tasks
(e.g., steering and braking responses) require level 1 SA.
Tactical driving tasks require levels 1 and 2 SA to facili-
tate safe maneuvering of a vehicle in traffic by judging
and comparing lane positions. Strategic tasks require
level 3 SA for near-term projection of changes in the
driving course and traffic patterns or for formulation of
navigation plans.
On the other hand, Gugerty (2011) discussed situa-
tion awareness in driving with a focus on managing
attention. His model involves three cognitive processes
to update and maintain SA as knowledge: (1) automatic,
preattentive processes that occur unconsciously and
place almost no demands on cognitive resources; (2) rec-
ognition-primed decision processes that may be con-
scious for brief periods (< 1 second) and place few
demands on cognitive resources; and (3) conscious, con-
trolled processes that place heavy demands on cognitive
resources. His model is conceptually different from
Endsley’s model. However, in practice, it compromises
with Endsley’s in that perceiving the elements of a situa-
tion (level 1 SA) is probably highly automated in most
situations, whereas comprehension and projection (levels
2 and 3 SA) are more likely to use recognition-primed
and controlled processes.
In addition to these attempts, there have been several
empirical studies that try to engage SA in driving con-
texts. Walker, Stanton, and Young (2006) evaluated the
effects of different forms of nonvisual vehicle feedback
on driver SA using a probe–recall method. The findings
confirm that the vehicle feedback (particularly auditory
Table 1. The Relationship between Situation Awareness Components in Endsley’s (1995a) Model and Typical Cognitive Processes
that Are Addressed in Emotion Literature
Level of situation awareness Sub-components of each level of SA Typical cognitive processes
Level 1 SA, perception The processes of monitoring, cue
detection, and simple recognition
Attention & perception
Level 2 SA, comprehension The processes of pattern recognition,
interpretation, and evaluation
Interpretation & judgment
Level 3 SA, projection Comprehension of the situation, and
then extrapolating that information
forward in time to determine how it will
affect future states of the operational
environment
Judgment & decision-making
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feedback) plays a key role in coupling drivers to the dy-
namics of their environment. An interesting result is that
drivers demonstrated little awareness of diminished SA
despite the large changes in vehicle feedback.
Other studies identified positive associations between
SA and one or more dimensions of driving performance
using various secondary tasks (Johannsdottir & Herd-
man, 2010; Ma & Kaber, 2005, 2007). For example,
Ma and Kaber (2005) examined driver situation aware-
ness involving an adaptive cruise control (ACC) system
while calling on a cell phone. Results showed that the
use of the ACC system improved overall driver SA under
typical driving conditions, and reduced driver mental
workload. However, the cell phone conversation (i.e.,
driving-irrelevant dialogue) degenerated driver SA (espe-
cially, levels 2 and 3 SA) and increased driver mental
workload. The stage of perception (level 1 SA) may place
relatively lower demands on human mental resources, as
compared to comprehension (level 2 SA) and projection
(level 3 SA), and consequently drivers may be able to
address such demands even when resource competition
occurs (Ma & Kaber, 2005). In a subsequent study, Ma
and Kaber (2007) assessed the effects of in-vehicle navi-
gation aids and reliability on driver SA and performance
in a simulated navigation task. Results revealed that per-
fect navigation information generally improved driver SA
and performance compared to unreliable navigation in-
formation and task-irrelevant information. They con-
cluded that the in-vehicle automation appears to mediate
the relationship of driver SA to performance in terms of
operational and strategic behaviors. In summary,
whereas research has shown the relationship between
situation awareness and driver workload or automation,
little research has addressed the relationship between sit-
uation awareness and driver emotion, which is a unique
contribution of the current paper.
3.3 Situation Awareness Measurement
in Dynamic Contexts
Situation awareness is a complex process that
requires assessment by diverse online (during driving)
and offline (post-driving) measures (Gugerty, 2011).
Endsley (1995b) reviewed methodologies for the mea-
surement of situation awareness in dynamic systems. As
discussed earlier, performance and SA showed a positive
correlation, but performance measures suffer from diffi-
culty in diagnosis and lack of sensitivity. Alternatives to
these measures have been brought forth, such as a freeze
technique used in the SAGAT (Situation Awareness
Global Assessment Technique; Endsley, 1995b, 2000)
and the SPAM (Situation-Present Assessment Method;
Durso et al., 1999; Durso et al., 1995). The SAGAT is
an online query technique that taps an individual’s recent
memory of the situation. In the SAGAT, driving infor-
mation on the display is removed and randomly selected
questions are presented to the operator. The more
queries correctly answered, the better is the operator’s
SA. In the SPAM, SAGAT-like queries are given to the
operator, but information remains in view and response
latency is used as the primary dependent measure. In
these context-freeze techniques, SA queries have been
frequently given during the task. Although these techni-
ques are widely used, frequent queries may not be appro-
priate for the current study. First, providing queries may
disrupt driving and influence the other measures as well.
Second, frequent queries may enable drivers to concen-
trate more on driving behavior and even to memorize
contextual information, which is not the case in an actual
affective state. The presence of an assessment technique
during driving is also likely to distract participants from
the affective source and lead to deterioration of the
meaning of the current experiment. Therefore, in the
current experiment, SA was assessed with two types of
techniques, one during driving and the other after the
driving task.
The first SA measure was the implicit performance
measure (e.g., Durso et al., 1999), which is operationally
defined as the coping level with hazard events. Hazard
perception has been considered as a way to measure sit-
uation awareness for dangerous situations in the traffic
environment (Horswill & McKenna, 2004). Whereas
empirical research has shown counterintuitive results
stating that driving skill is not an important discrimina-
tory variable for road safety (e.g., Williams & O’Neill,
1974), only drivers’ hazard perception has been found
to correlate with drivers’ accident records. Researchers
have widely used filmed traffic situations for a hazard
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perception test and asked participants to actively respond
whenever they detect a traffic hazard, using a lever (e.g.,
Pelz & Krupat, 1974), button (e.g., McKenna & Crick,
1991), or touch screen (e.g., Hull & Christie, 1992).
However, requiring such an active response from partici-
pants is different from the natural driving environment
and in the current experiment it might distract partici-
pants from their affective source. Therefore, we used an
implicit performance measure instead of obtaining
explicit real-time responses. The driving scenario has ten
events (see Table 3) that require a driver’s attention and
each event can be recognizable 3–5 seconds before it
happens, so participants can predict the event in advance
and respond appropriately. If the participants have good
situation awareness at that moment, they are expected to
cope with the situation effectively and appropriately.
Another measure is an offline questionnaire using an
adaptation of the SAGAT. Endsley (1995b) once sug-
gested that this type of post-test questionnaire would
reliably capture the subject’s SA at the end of the trial.
Our offline query includes three different parts: (1) ques-
tions about the last driving scene, which measures SA;
(2) questions about the whole driving, measuring driv-
ing-relevant, long-term memory; and (3) driving-irrele-
vant questions as a baseline. The recall-based queries (2)
may be biased by participants’ subjective recall ability
and be arguable. However, in the same paper (Endsley,
1995b), the empirical results showed that the SA infor-
mation is obtainable from long-term memory stores if
schemata or other mechanisms are used to organize SA
information. Thus, the SA information, which was
clearly processed with respect to driving, may be able to
remain longer (i.e., deep processing) than other irrele-
vant information (i.e., shallow processing).
4 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Recent empirical research (Jeon, Walker, & Yim, in
press; Jeon et al., 2011) has shown that different discrete
emotions might have specific effects on various measures
of driving performance. Interestingly, however, these
performance differences were not directly reflected at a
conscious level in the measures, including subjective risk
perception or perceived workload. This subtlety has
motivated researchers to further investigate the relation-
ship between emotions and driving in a more sophisti-
cated way. In the current research, we attempt to
examine emotional effects on driving performance,
considering situation awareness as a medium between
the two. This approach is expected to identify the roles
and mechanisms of emotional effects in a dynamic envi-
ronment more systematically. To test the possible spe-
cific effects, we focus on anger, one of the most critical
emotional states in driving (e.g., Jeon & Walker, 2011).
Once additional knowledge on the roles and mechanisms
of the affective effects is accumulated, more effective
intervention strategies can be determined about how to
mitigate the affective effects on driving performance and
safety.
In this research, we try to attain a deeper understand-
ing of the effects of affective states on driver situation
awareness and driving performance measures. More spe-
cifically, we are interested in the following two research
questions:
1. Can we predict the emotional effects on driving
performance based on drivers’ self-awareness?
2. Can the situation awareness model provide an
appropriate mechanism to explain the emotional
effects on driving performance?
To answer these research questions, we conducted an
experiment, in which young drivers (college students)
drove in a simulator after either anger or neutral affect
induction to examine whether the induced angry state
influences drivers’ situation awareness and driving per-
formance as well as perceived workload and subjective
judgment regarding their general driving. In addition to
collecting various driving performance variables, the data
on situation awareness were collected during driving
(implicit performance) and in the end of the session (off-
line questionnaire) (Durso et al., 1999). As discussed,
affective states have a considerable amount of impact on
various cognitive states and these effects should be
reflected on each level of the SA model, thereby the over-
all SA.
Here are our hypotheses for the experiment.
Hypothesis 1. Anger will degrade driving perform-
ance more than neutral affect.
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Hypothesis 2. Anger will degrade driver situation
awareness in terms of both implicit performance and
the offline questionnaire as compared to neutral
affect.
Hypothesis 3. Driving performance results will be posi-
tively correlated with situation awareness levels.
Hypothesis 4. Subjective judgment on general driving
behavior after anger induction will not be different
from that of the neutral state (based on Jeon et al., in
press; Jeon et al., 2011).
Hypothesis 5. Perceived workload of the angry state
will not be different from that of the neutral state
(based on Jeon et al., in press; Jeon et al., 2011).
5 Experiment
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants. Of the 35 undergraduate
students who registered for the study, five (14%) par-
ticipants showed symptoms of simulation sickness in
the screening protocol (Gable & Walker, 2013), so
they were excused from the remaining experimental
procedure. Thus, 30 participants (see Table 2 for
details) completed the experiment for partial credit in
psychology courses. They reported normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision and hearing, and provided
informed consent and demographic details about age,
gender, and years of driving. All participants were
required to have a driver’s license and more than two
years of driving experience to control for any effects
of novice drivers. Therefore, all of the participants
could be categorized as an ‘‘advanced apprentice/jun-
ior journeyman’’ group in terms of driving experience
level (Durso & Dattel, 2006). For the purpose of the
study, participants were not clearly informed about
the goal of the study, but they were debriefed after
the experiment. In the debriefing session, they were
told about an impact of induced anger and plausible
risks.
5.1.2 Apparatus. Figure 1 shows a mid-fidelity
National Advanced Driving Simulator (NADS) Min-
iSim version 1.8.3.3. The simulation software runs on a
single computer, running Microsoft Windows 7 Pro on
an Intel Core i7 processor, 3.07 GHz and 12 GB of
RAM, and relays sound through a 2.1 audio system.
Three Panasonic TH-42PH2014 42@ plasma displays,
each with a 1280  800 pixel resolution, allow for a
total of 1308 field of view in front of the seated partici-
pant. The center monitor is 28 inches from the center
of the steering wheel and the left and right monitors are
37 inches from the center of the steering wheel. The
MiniSim also includes a steering wheel, adjustable car
seat, gear-shift, and gas and brake pedals, as well as a
Toshiba Ltd. WXGA TFT LCD monitor with a 1280 
800 resolution to display the speedometer, etc. Envi-
ronmental sound effects are also played through two
embedded speakers. These sounds included engine
noise, brake screech, turn indicators, collisions, etc. In
the present experiment, all participants experienced the
same predefined route and properties for the driving
task.
Table 2. Participant Information in Each Condition
No. of
men
No. of
women Age Years of driving
Anger 9 6 20.6 M ¼ 4.5, SD ¼ 1.9
Neutral 7 8 21.2 M ¼ 5.2, SD ¼ 3.3
There was no significant difference between the two con-
ditions in terms of gender, age, and mean year of driving.
Figure 1. View of the driving simulator. Each participant drove the
same pre-defined route.
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5.1.3 Driving Scenario. A driving scenario was
created using the iSAT software, which comes with the
NADS MiniSim. The scenario included an urban road
(with speed limit 40 mph) and a highway (with speed
limit 50–65 mph). Also, it contained various road signs
and vehicles, traffic signals, and pedestrians commonly
seen in an actual driving environment. Ten different haz-
ard events (see Table 3) were created in the scenario to
measure driver situation awareness. Those events
occurred approximately every minute, beginning a
minute after the start of the drive.
5.1.4 Design and Procedure. Prior to any data
collection, the protocol for this study was submitted to
and accepted by the Georgia Tech Institutional Review
Board ethical committee. This review included a submis-
sion of all study materials and protocols and was neces-
sary to be cleared by the committee before starting the
study, particularly in this case due to the manipulation of
emotions. Participants were first asked to complete a
consent form and then given instructions of what the
study would entail. Participants were then asked to rate
their current affective states using seven-point Likert-
type scales (1: not feel at all  7: strongly feel). The
affective states included nine discrete adjectives that were
reported as important affective states in driving contexts:
fearful, happy, angry, depressed, confused, embarrassed,
urgent, bored, and relieved (e.g., Ashley, 2001; Eyben
et al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2013; Jones & Jonsson,
2008; Li & Ji, 2005; Lisseti & Nasoz, 2005; for empiri-
cal factor extraction, see Jeon & Walker, 2011). Then,
participants went through the Georgia Tech Simulator
Sickness Screening Protocol (Gable & Walker, 2013)
where they were asked to: (1) rate their current physical
feelings on 17 categories using an 11-point Likert-type
scales (0: not feel at all  10: strongly feel); (2) drive a
two-minute city driving scenario in the simulator (dif-
ferent from the scenario used in the actual experiment);
and (3) rate their physical feelings again on the same
questionnaire. If the participants felt any symptoms of
simulator sickness (e.g., light-headed, dizzy, or other
adverse reaction) at any time during the drive, the simu-
lation was stopped and they were excused from testing.
They were also excused from testing if their scores
showed signs of simulator sickness (i.e., if any number is
greater than or equal to 5 more than the pre-drive sur-
vey, or if any three of the ratings are above 3 as com-
pared to the pre-drive survey, adapted from Gianaros,
Muth, Mordkoff, Levine, & Stern, 2001).
Participants who had not shown evidence of simulator
sickness continued into the actual experimental task.
These participants were randomly assigned to either the
anger or neutral emotion condition. To induce a particu-
lar affective state, participants had 12 minutes to write a
description of a past emotional experience, which is a fre-
quently used affect induction methodology (e.g., Bod-
enhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Ellsworth &
Smith, 1988). Moreover, a recent study shows that this
is the most effective among other affect induction meth-
ods (Lobbestael, Arnttz, & Wiers, 2007). An experi-
menter instructed them to remember the memory as
clearly as possible and to emotionally revisit the experi-
ence again. Participants in the anger condition were
urged to refer to two sample paragraphs (Bodenhausen
et al., 1994; Jeon et al., in press) in the instruction sheet
to help them write their own paragraphs. One of these
was related to driving as shown in the following:
‘‘. . .I was already late for the meeting when I woke
up. I quickly packed all resources I organized last
Table 3. Hazard Events in the Driving Scenario
Predictable hazard events
Event 1. Car crosses over center line into driver’s
lane
Event 2. Motorcycle pulls into driver’s lane
Event 3. Traffic signal suddenly changes to yellow
in the intersection
Event 4. Car U-turns in front of driver
Event 5. Boy runs out from behind a parked car
Event 6. Car pulls into road ahead of driver
Event 7. Truck suddenly appears in highway
entrance
Event 8. Construction and lane merge
Event 9. Two deer cross road
Event 10. Car entering highway cuts off driver
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night and drove my car in a hurry. But after a while, a
huge truck blocked the road and a series of cars were
waiting for that truck to make a U-turn. I saw there
was not enough space for the truck and all cars had to
back up, one by one, to make more space during the
already hectic morning hours. It was a disaster!’’
(Anger)
If participants had more than one experience to write
about, they could choose to write about all of them
within the time provided. Participants in the neutral
affect condition wrote a description of the mundane
events of the previous day (Bodenhausen et al., 1994;
Jeon et al., 2011).
After writing the mood-induction paragraphs, partici-
pants completed a second rating of their affective states
and then answered subjective judgment questions
regarding driving competence and risk perception (e.g.,
Dorn & Matthews, 1995) using seven-point Likert-type
scales: (1) How do you feel about your confidence level
for driving? (2) How much do you feel accident risk in
your driving? (3) Do you think your driving is safer than
other drivers who are your same age and gender?
After these questionnaires, participants drove the pre-
defined scenario, which lasted approximately 13
minutes. They were instructed to drive as they would
drive in the real world, following any traffic and safety
rules. Through the driving course, participants drove on
the same road except for one left turn, which the experi-
menter announced in advance. Immediately after the
drive, participants were asked to answer the offline SA
assessment questionnaire. After filling out the SA ques-
tionnaire, participants completed the third affective state
rating. Finally, they filled out the electronic version of
the NASA-TLX (Hart, 2006) to provide measurements
of perceived workload for the overall driving task, and a
short questionnaire for demographic information and
comments regarding the study. All the participants were
then debriefed on the study, and about possible residual
effects of emotions on their real-world driving. Addi-
tional data collected included number of errors commit-
ted while driving, as recorded by a trained experimenter,
and how the drivers coped with hazard events. These
observed data served as implicit measures of driver SA.
Meanwhile, driving performance data were also logged
by the driving simulator.
5.1.5 Dependent Variables for Driving
Performance. Driving performance data were collected
(1) manually by a real-time judge who was present at all
times, and (2) by system logging:
1. Manually recorded observer’s log: During the drive, a
trained experimenter recorded the number of all
driving errors, as well as the coping level with the ten
hazard events, as an implicit performancemeasure
for driver SA. The coping level for each event was
scored as 0: smoothmanagement; 1: near accident
with brake screech sound; or 2: crash with objects
(thus, their overall implicit performance scores across
ten events could range from0: best to 20: worst).
Manually counted number of errors included four
general driving performancemeasures that anger has
been shown to influence negatively (e.g., Dula,Mar-
tin, Fox,& Leonard, 2011; Jeon et al., in press; Jeon
et al., 2011). Specifically, crossing the centerline and
sideline were combined into ‘‘LaneDeviation.’’
(LD). Infractions of red lights and failure to use turn
signals were categorized under ‘‘Traffic Rules’’ (TR).
Violations of the speed limit were named ‘‘Over
Speed’’ (OS), and collisions were named ‘‘Collision’’
(CO). These variables were chosen because anger
easily leads to aggressive behaviors and these aggres-
sive behaviors in driving situations often cause road
rage (Burns&Katovich, 2003).
2. Automatically recorded system log: Additional driv-
ing performance data were automatically logged in
the driving simulator. These data included five
driving performance categories: Lane Deviation
(deviation of the center of the vehicle from the cen-
ter of the road in feet), Speed, Steering Wheel
Angle, Brake Pedal Force, and Collision. The first
four variables contained various calculated values
such as average, standard deviation, maximum, and
minimum. Lane Deviation also included the num-
ber of lane crossings.
Other driving tasks such as the lane-change-test
(Mattes, 2003) or headway distance measures (e.g., Ma
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& Kaber, 2005) were not used in this study because par-
ticipants might concentrate more on those tasks, being
distracted from their affective source.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Manipulation Checks. We assumed that
the participants were equal due to their random place-
ment in conditions. As Figure 2 shows, there was no dif-
ference in their initial angry state. Moreover, there was
no significant difference in any emotional state between
the two groups before induction.
Participants’ writings about past experiences were con-
gruent with previous research (Ellsworth & Smith,
1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Overall, participants in
the angry state tended to describe events related to
‘‘other-responsibility’’ and ‘‘individual control,’’ includ-
ing conflict with colleagues (4 participants), frustration
at parents (1), failed tasks or bad jobs (5), lost chances or
personal belongings (3), and road rage (2). For the neu-
tral condition, participants described just daily activities
such as driving or walking (6), getting ready in the
morning/for bed (2), grocery shopping (1), and other
routines (6), which are also in accordance with previous
research (Jeon et al., 2011).
Figure 2 shows the overall mean rating of angry states
at the three times. Results were analyzed with a separate
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) for
each affective condition. An ANOVA result revealed a
statistically significant difference among the three tim-
ings for anger: F(2, 28) ¼ 4.41, p < .05, Zp2 ¼ .24. For
the multiple comparisons among the three timings for
anger, paired samples t-tests were conducted. For multi-
ple comparisons of within-subjects conditions, we can
use either Bonferroni or Scheffe (Keppel & Wickens,
2004). Bonferroni is used when forming the contrasts
without looking at the means. When researchers have al-
ready peeked at the means, which is our case, Scheffe’s
procedure is used. For both, the calculations are the
same, but only for Bonferroni, a corrected a level is used.
We kept using a ¼ .05 based on Scheffe’s for further
multiple comparisons. The anger score after induction
(M ¼ 2.87, SD ¼ 1.6) was higher than before induction
(M ¼ 1.33, SD ¼ 1.3, t(14) ¼ 2.88, p < .05). The an-
ger score after the experiment (M ¼ 2.40, SD ¼ 1.9)
numerically decreased from its peak, t(14) ¼ 1.10, p >
.05, which was numerically higher than before induc-
tion, t(14) ¼ 1.74, p ¼ .10. For the neutral condition,
the change of participants’ angry state was also analyzed.
Participants in the neutral condition showed no signifi-
cant change among the three timings for anger.
In short, the intended anger level increased after the
induction procedure and decreased while driving. Even
after the experimental procedure (around 15–20
minutes), induced anger seemed to still remain high.
5.2.2 Driving Performance. As reported, driv-
ing performance data were collected in the two ways:
manual log and system log, and both of them showed
significant differences between the two conditions.
1. Manual log: Figure 3 shows overall driving per-
formance aggregated across four categories in both
affective states. Participants in the anger condition
(M ¼ 9.53, SD ¼ 3.6) showed significantly more
errors than those in the neutral condition (M ¼
5.67, SD ¼ 3.0, t(28) ¼ 3.19, p < .01). Figure 4
shows the number of driving errors according to
error type in both affective states, which indicates
that participants in the anger condition consistently
Figure 2. Anger rating scores across rating timings. In the anger
condition, the anger score after induction was higher than the score
before induction. Also, the score after the experiment was higher than
the score before induction. For the neutral condition, there was no signifi-
cant change in the anger rating scores. Error bars indicate standard error
of the mean.
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made more errors in the neutral condition except
for the number of collisions. For each type of driv-
ing errors, independent sample t-tests revealed that
the participants in the angry state (M ¼ 2.13, SD ¼
1.4) made significantly more lane deviation times
than in the neutral state (M ¼ 1.00, SD ¼ 0.8,
t(28) ¼ 2.75, p ¼ .01). Additionally, the partici-
pants in the angry state (M ¼ 6.80, SD ¼ 1.8)
made a significantly higher number of over speed
errors than in the neutral state (M ¼ 4.27, SD ¼
2.9, t(28) ¼ 2.87, p < .001).
2. System log: Figure 5 shows the mean maximum
speed in both affective states. Participants in the
anger condition (M ¼ 74.11, SD ¼ 6.0) had a sig-
nificantly higher maximum speed than neutral par-
ticipants (M ¼ 70.05, SD ¼ 2.3, t(28) ¼ 2.44,
p < .05). Figure 6 shows the mean number of lane
deviation times. Again, participants in the anger
condition (M ¼ 18.4, SD ¼ 7.0) had a significantly
higher number of lane deviation times than neutral
participants (M ¼ 13.3, SD ¼ 4.1, t(28) ¼ 2.45,
p < .05). There was no other variable to show a
significant difference between the two conditions.
These consistent results were confirmed by highly pos-
itive correlations between the manual log data and the
system log data (lane deviation with lane deviation times,
r ¼ .53, p ¼ .002, with average lane deviation, r ¼ .46,
p < .05, with SD of lane deviation, r ¼ .62, p < .001;
over speed with average speed, r ¼ .68, p < .001, with
maximum speed, r ¼ .57, p ¼ .001; collisions with colli-
sions, r ¼ .32, p ¼ .092).
Figure 3. Number of overall driving errors in both affective states
(manual log). Anger led to significantly more errors than neutral. Error
bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Figure 4. Number of errors according to error type in both affective
states (manual log). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Figure 5. Maximum speed in both affective states (system log). Anger
led to significantly higher maximum speed than neutral. Error bars
indicate standard error of the mean.
Figure 6. Number of lane deviation times in both affective states
(system log). Anger showed significantly more lane deviation times than
neutral. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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To ensure that no other variables influenced the per-
formance results, the results for gender and driving expe-
rience were also analyzed. For gender, there was no sig-
nificantly different number of errors between women
(N ¼ 14) (M ¼ 6.43, SD ¼ 2.7) and men (N ¼ 16)
(M ¼ 8.86, SD ¼ 4.4). For driving experience, years of
driving did not show a significant correlation with the
number of driving errors. However, years of driving
showed a significantly negative correlation with the max-
imum speed (r ¼ .41, p < .05) and the brake pedal
force standard deviation (r ¼ .45, p < .05). In other
words, more experienced drivers were not likely to drive
with higher speed and showed more reliable brake pedal
force. However, these differences did not bias either
condition in the study because there was no significant
difference in years of driving between the anger condi-
tion (M ¼ 4.46, SD ¼ 1.9) and the neutral condition
(M ¼ 5.23, SD ¼ 3.3).
5.2.3 Situation Awareness. For the SA scores,
results were analyzed using independent samples t-tests
for both implicit performance and offline questionnaire
scores. Note that a higher score in the implicit perform-
ance measure means worse situation awareness, whereas
a higher score in the offline questionnaire means better
situation awareness. Figure 7 shows the mean implicit
performance scores in both affective states. Those with
induced anger (M ¼ 5.4, SD ¼ 2.0) had significantly
higher scores than neutral participants (M ¼ 4.0,
SD ¼ 1.6, t(28) ¼ 2.12, p < .05), which means that par-
ticipants in the angry state had lower driver situation
awareness than in the neutral state. Figure 8 shows the
mean offline questionnaire scores. Overall, in all three
parts of the questionnaire, participants in the anger condi-
tion gained lower scores than participants in the neutral
condition, which means lower situation awareness. In
questions about (1) the last driving scene (operationally
defined as SA, here), angry participants (M ¼ 3.8, SD ¼
1.5) had lower scores than those in the neutral condition
(M ¼ 4.2, SD ¼ 1.2), but it was not statistically reliable:
t(28)¼ .798, p > .05. In questions about (2) the
whole driving, angry participants (M ¼ 0.9, SD ¼ 0.9)
had marginally lower scores than participants in the
neutral condition (M ¼ 1.7, SD ¼ 1.2, t(28)¼ 1.90,
p ¼ .068). In questions about (3) driving-irrelevant items,
those in the angry condition (M ¼ 0.3, SD ¼ 0.4) had
significantly lower scores than neutral participants
(M ¼ 0.6, SD ¼ 0.5, t(28) ¼ 2.21, p < .05).
Implicit performance SA scores significantly positively
correlated with the number of errors in the manual log
(r ¼ .37, p < .05). There were no significantly different
implicit performance SA scores between women (M ¼
4.29, SD ¼ 1.9) and men (M ¼ 5.13, SD ¼ 2.1). Also,
years of driving did not show a significant correlation
with situation awareness scores. There was no correlation
between the amount of increased angry state and situa-
tion awareness or performance (Jeon et al., 2011). In
other words, overall, angry drivers show worse situation
Figure 7. Implicit performance SA scores in both affective states. In
the anger condition, the score was significantly higher than in the neutral
condition, which means anger degrades driver situation awareness more.
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Figure 8. Offline SA questionnaire scores in both affective states. In
the anger condition, the scores were lower than in the neutral condition,
which means anger degrades driver situation awareness more. Error bars
indicate standard error of the mean.
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awareness and more driving errors on average, but the
change in the self-rating score cannot predict driver sit-
uation awareness or driving performance.
5.2.4 Subjective Judgment. For the subjective
judgment rating scores across the affective states, results
were analyzed with independent sample t-tests for each
question. Overall, no comparison led to statistically sig-
nificant results on subjective judgment ratings.
5.2.5 Perceived Workload. For the overall per-
ceived workload scores, independent sample t-tests also
showed no difference between the two affective states,
which means there is no significantly different perceived
workload resulting from an angry state.
5.3 Discussion
Our experiment compared diverse variables includ-
ing driving performance, situation awareness, subjective
judgment, and perceived workload in the induced angry
state with those in the neutral state. The overall results
demonstrated that induced anger can degenerate driver
situation awareness and driving performance. However,
it did not significantly influence either the subjective
judgment or the overall perceived workload, which
might imply that the effects created by the anger
occurred under participants’ conscious level.
5.3.1 Affect Induction. Having participants write
about their past experience seems to be successful in
terms of anger induction. It was found that the induced
anger decreased as the experiment went on, but a certain
amount of anger still remained after the experiment,
which accounts for the source of different outcomes
between the two emotion conditions. Self-rating alone
might not be a sufficient method to measure partici-
pants’ emotional change. For example, participants can
rate their state as what they are supposed to be. There
might be some individual differences with respect to rat-
ing the relative strength of their emotional change.
Nevertheless, self-rating is one of the standardized affect
measures in the domain (Helander & Khalid, 2006;
Mauss, & Robinson, 2009) to provide sufficient psycho-
logical evidence about discrete emotional states. To mea-
sure emotional changes more accurately, we are currently
using other physiological tools together (e.g., Jansen
et al., 2013).
In the traditional lab studies, psychologists have used
diverse emotion-priming methodologies, such as watch-
ing photos (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990) or film
clips (e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005), reading sce-
narios or stories (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Raghu-
nathan & Pham, 1999), listening to music (e.g., Jeff-
eries, Smilek, Eich, & Enns, 2008; Rowe, Hirsh, &
Anderson, 2007), or writing down their past experience
(e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002). On the other hand, driv-
ing researchers have tried to devise some hazard events
so that drivers got frustrated (i.e., integral affect) in
those scenarios (e.g., Harris & Nass, 2011; Lee, 2010).
In this experiment, we used both incidental (i.e., task-
irrelevant) and integral (i.e., task-relevant) affect pri-
ming. ‘‘Writing personal experiences’’ was used as inci-
dental affect induction, specifically because anger needs a
clear opponent or source of affect. In this aspect, looking
at photos or watching film clips might not be sufficient
to induce anger. Moreover, because driving is a much
more complicated and longer-lasting task than a simple
social judgment or decision-making task, the strength
and duration of induced affective states are expected to
be more important and have a greater influence on driv-
ing performance. Therefore, this experiment also
included some hazard events in the scenario as a source
of integral affect. The results support that the multiple
emotion-priming methods used in the current experi-
ment work well for this type of emotional driving study.
Using both incidental and integral affect may make our
experiment more similar to the real situation.
Note that it is debatable whether the induced affective
states in a driving simulator are equivalent to affective
states in actual driving. The affective effects in the actual
driving context might be different (or larger) than in the
simulator. However, the significant results of the current
simulation study demonstrate that there is necessity for
further research. In addition, we have the following fea-
tures in our simulation environment that literature
points out as components to make a virtual environment
more similar to the real world: (1) three-dimensional
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viewing (vs. 2-D); (2) dynamicity in terms of time per-
ception (vs. static images); (3) closed-loop interaction
(vs. open loop) (e.g., Carignan & Cleary, 2000): there is
little delay from the time the action is initiated until
motion occurs; (4) egocentric frame of references (vs.
exocentric view) (McCormick, Wickens, Banks, & Yeh,
1998; Peterson, Wells, Furness, & Hunt, 1998); and (5)
multimodal interaction (vs. unimodal interaction)
(Werkhoven & Groen, 1998). As discussed in Method
(Section 5.1), our simulator has visual, auditory, and tac-
tile/haptic feedback (e.g., steering, brake and gas ped-
als). Therefore, we assume that our participants had
‘‘sufficient information’’ about the task environment in
terms of the sensory-motor system simulation about vir-
tual presence (Sheridan, 1992) and ecological validity
(i.e., similarity of perceptual stimuli; see Hammond,
1998). If we have physical forces on the whole body
when accelerating or stopping, it would be more helpful
in terms of participants’ immersion.
Even though our participants were aware of their an-
ger (at least incidental anger from their own writing),
they seemed not to notice or predict the ‘‘effects’’ of an-
ger on their driving as shown in their subjective judg-
ment or perceived workload.
5.3.2 Driving Performance. Angry participants
‘‘consistently’’ showedmore errors than neutral partici-
pants in most error types. From this experiment, specific
anger effects on driving variables were clearly confirmed
including over speed, more lane deviations, andmore
infractions of traffic rules, which is consistent with litera-
ture (Deffenbacher et al., 2003; Jeon et al., 2011; Ste-
phens &Groeger, 2008; Underwood et al., 1999). All of
these components make their drivingmore risky and are
likely to lead to fatal outcomes when integrated with other
situations in real driving.Most previous research has
shown these effects based on the survey instrument
depending on participants’ memory about their own be-
havioral patterns and traits (e.g., Deffenbacher et al.,
2003; Nesbit &Conger, 2012). However, the current
study confirms those results with empirical driving and
induced affect state. This state–anger research will bemore
useful in terms of policy making and prevention technol-
ogy development (Abdu, Shinar, &Meiran, 2012).
Research has shown that participants who are asked to
do dual tasks while driving intuitively adopt an adaptive
behavior in order to perform the secondary task (Chen
& Lin, 2003; Gugerty, Rando, Rakauskas, Brooks, &
Olson, 2003; Tchankue, Wesson, & Vogts, 2011). For
example, Chen and Lin (2003) showed that participants
compensated for the increased reaction time by increas-
ing the headway distance to the lead car and decreasing
speed during the dual-task scenario (driving and talking)
using a hands-free cell phone. In the present experiment,
however, participants did not show such a tendency to
make up for their degenerated performance. Participants
with anger consistently drove faster, showed more lane
deviation, and violated rules and signals more than par-
ticipants with neutral. Because they did not notice the
‘‘effects’’ of their affective state on their driving, they
seemed to lack compensational strategies. Drivers’ lack
of awareness of emotional effects on driving performance
might make emotional driving more dangerous com-
pared to driving with secondary tasks. To objectively
assess it, we are currently comparing the effects of emo-
tions with the effects of secondary tasks on driving per-
formance in a single study.
5.3.3 Situation Awareness. As expected, driver
situation awareness was degenerated by induced anger,
especially when measured using implicit performance.
Offline questionnaire results showed a similar pattern,
but did not lead to a statistically significant difference in
part 1, which was intended to measure driver SA. It
seems that the one-time survey may not be sufficient to
obtain enough statistical power. As discussed earlier, the
SAGAT or the SPAM frequently asks participants about
their situation awareness to get sufficient data. One
interesting result is that the participants in the anger
condition also showed lower scores than in the neutral
condition in part 3, questions of which were not related
to a primary driving task, such as restaurant names and
signs. It was originally hypothesized that participants in
both groups would be similarly bad at answering those
task-irrelevant items. Due to this unexpected different
result in part 3, however, it became less clear whether
better results of the neutral participants in part 1 and
part 2 came from different processing levels and mem-
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ory, or came from just different response attitudes to-
ward any questions based on their affective states.
Situation awareness scores were positively correlated
with some of the driving performance measures as
hypothesized. Therefore, one can infer that the anger
might decrease driver situation awareness, which degen-
erates driving performance in turn. However, in order to
identify a clear causal relationship, further research is
required with more participants (e.g., a mediation model
among emotion, SA, and performance measures).
Based on the present results, it is difficult to say that
the coping level of hazard events corresponds to driving
techniques or experience. First of all, years of driving did
not show a significant correlation with situation aware-
ness scores, nor with driving performance. In addition,
driving literature has usually reported that nine to ten
years of difference is needed to make significantly differ-
ent performance levels between participants (e.g., Durso
& Dattel, 2006). There was no difference in years of
driving between the two conditions in the current
experiment.
For the original purpose of this study, the relationship
between emotional processes and situation awareness
and its effects on driving performance can be further dis-
entangled in terms of more theoretical aspects. Endsley
and her colleagues (Endsley, Bolte, & Jones, 2003) clas-
sified SA demons—the enemies of situation awareness,
as follows: attention tunneling, requisite memory trap,
workload, anxiety, fatigue, and other stressors
(WAFOS), data overload, misplaced salience, complexity
creep, errant mental models, and out-of-loop syndrome.
Based on the identical results between the two condi-
tions, workload can be eliminated from the current dis-
cussion. Among the remaining others, it seems reasona-
ble to focus on delineating attentional tunneling as the
anger effects on situation awareness with respect to our
experiment.
Constant juggling of different aspects of the environ-
ment is a key factor for successful SA. Unfortunately,
people can often get trapped in a phenomenon called
attentional tunneling (Baddeley, 1972; Broadbent,
1954), in which people lock in on certain aspects or fea-
tures of the environment they are trying to process, and
will either intentionally or inadvertently drop their scan-
ning behavior. Even though drivers can consistently scan
their environment, it does not necessarily mean that the
information at that location is processed. Such instances
resulting from a failure of divided attention has also been
called inattentional blindness and has been widely
explored in laboratory studies (Simons & Chabris,
1999). In either case, drivers cannot maintain good SA.
These types of attentional issues can arise from affective
sources, which are assumed to happen in the current
experiment. Rumination is one of the cognitive
demands or resource misallocations created by affective
sources (Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005). It is
defined as ‘‘a class of conscious thoughts that revolve
around a common instrumental theme and that recur in
the absence of immediate environmental demands
requiring the thoughts’’ (p. 7). According to Berkowitz
(1989), goal blockage that is common to ruminative
thought frequently precedes an affective response such
as frustration, anger, or anxiety. Moreover, if the cause
of the affective state is unrelated to the current perform-
ance episode (i.e., incidental affect, which is also the case
in the current experiment), continued ruminative
thoughts should serve as an additional cognitive demand
that interferes with task performance (Beal et al., 2005).
This successive chain can also be well explained by the
framework, ‘‘presence’’ (Sheridan, 1992). It is worth
noting that researchers have used a space metaphor about
presence, such as ‘‘being there’’ (Minsky, 1980) and
‘‘feeling of being present in an environment other than
one the person is actually in’’ (Sheridan, 1992). We
interpret that our participants felt a type of presence or
immersion into their past experience after they wrote
their emotional memory. Because their attention was
captured in that past virtual space (i.e., rumination), they
showed a type of inattentional blindness in the present
driving environment. This also corresponds to other
driving literature, which shows that the deficits with the
secondary tasks are due to engaging other cognitive con-
texts, not due to physical activities (Strayer & Johnston,
2001). In other words, participants sat in the driving
simulator physically, but they might have visited their
past experience environment mentally. Consequently,
their SA about the current driving environment was
degraded. They seemed to assess their driving environ-
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ment superficially (Stephens, Trawley, Madigan, &
Groeger, 2012).
In summary, induced anger yielded rumination due to
participants’ immersion in the emotional context, which
led to attentional tunneling or inattentional blindness so
that drivers did not develop complete and accurate
knowledge of driving environments and vehicle states
(i.e., situation awareness), and thereby driving perform-
ance was degenerated.
5.3.4 Subjective Judgment. Given that subjec-
tive judgment scales showed no difference between the
anger and the neutral conditions, we can conclude that
their conscious responses did not reflect any anger
effects. Based on their affect rating scores, we can assume
that participants might feel a certain level of anger after
affect induction. However, those subject feelings might
not influence their judgment about their confidence,
safety, or risk level in the context of driving. As a result,
they did not compensate for their performance decrease
in driving. In other words, participants seemed to fail to
link their affective state and their behavioral changes.
People generally do not know well what they are feel-
ing (even though they think they are well aware of it)
(Picard, 2010). Affect research has shown that even just
awareness of the source of one’s affective state can make
the person less influenced by those affective states (Tie-
dens & Linton, 2001). This can support the necessity of
an affect detection and regulation system for drivers
(Eyben et al., 2010). Objectively carried information on
a driver’s current affective state can be powerful and can
facilitate driver situation awareness by awakening them
from their affective source.
5.3.5 Perceived Workload. It is an important
finding that there was no significant difference in per-
ceived workload between the two conditions. It strongly
supports that affective effects are independent of con-
sciously perceived workload. Then, it might imply that
emotion research needs a different approach or frame-
work from the workload research tradition. It would be
prudent to measure objective workload in an effort to
determine if it is simply subjective workload that is not
affected by anger or if objectivemeasures of workload
show a similar result. To this end, our on-going study is
using functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS)
(Derosie`re, Mandrick, Dray, Ward, & Perrey, 2013) for
objective workload measure. If performance degenera-
tion in the angry state is not because of workload, there
should be other mechanisms that need to be identified
further.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
The present study investigated the mechanism of
the consciously unnoticeable emotional effects on driv-
ing performance. Results showed that situation aware-
ness could be a conduit between the angry state and
reduced driving performance. Our experiment also sup-
ported that the presence of anger did not influence their
conscious risk perception and subjective workload
scores. Given that angry participants did not show any
compensation for their degenerated driving perform-
ance, affective effects might be more serious than the
effects of secondary tasks, for which a driver is likely to
show some adaptive compensation strategies.
In this study, the emotional effects on performance in
a dynamic situation were more deeply explored by inte-
grating the construct of situation awareness, whereas
more research is needed to show a clearer causal relation-
ship among those constructs (see Jeon, 2012a). If situa-
tion awareness is a critical medium between a drivers’
emotional state and driving performance, then we could
try to devise intervention strategies to increase driver sit-
uation awareness in addition to regulating drivers’ emo-
tional state. It would also be a good research question
whether we need to use subliminal cues (e.g., music
[Jeon, 2012b], smell, etc.) as an intervention for emo-
tional drivers given that driving is a highly demanding
task.
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